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Abstract: Selection through iterated learning explains no more than other non-functional 
accounts, such as universal grammar, why language is so well-designed for communicative 
efficiency. It does not predict several distinctive features of language like central embedding, 
large lexicons or the lack of iconicity, that seem to serve communication purposes at the 
expense of learnability. 
 
 
Christiansen and Chater rightfully observe that communicatively arbitrary 
principles, such as UG, are unable to explain why language is adequate for 
communication. The same criticism can be addressed, however, to their own account. If 
the main driving force that led to language emergence is learnability rather than 
communicative efficiency, language should be locally optimal for the former and not for 
the latter. Evidence suggests that, in several respects, the exact opposite is the case. 
What would language be like if, as the authors claim, the cultural selection of 
learnable languages were “stronger” than the biological selection of brains designed for 
efficient communication? If language can compare with a “viral” entity that gets selected 
for its ability to resist vertical cultural transmission, we predict for instance iconic 
signifiers, especially gestures, to win the contest. Yet, although analogue resemblance 
makes learning almost trivial, linguistic evolution shows that non-iconic signifiers tend to 
prevail, even in sign languages.  
The “viral” theory of language does not explain the size of lexicons either. Ideally, 
an expressive code is easiest to learn, and resists iterated transmission best, if words are 
limited in number and have separate and unambiguous meanings. Yet, real vocabularies 
include tens of thousands of words, massive near synonymy and many rare unpredictable 
word combinations (Briscoe, 2006). Such evidence suggests that there may be some 
“viral” cause for the existence of plethoric lexicons, but its action is opposite to what is 
expected from selection for learning efficiency. 
Language, as mainly shaped by selection through repeated learning, is supposed 
to mirror the general human induction bias. Efficient induction systems (Solomonoff, 
1978), including human learning (Chater, 1999) and analogy making (Cornuéjols, 1996) 
are guided by a complexity minimization principle. If languages were the bare expression 
of a simplicity-based induction device looping on itself, we should expect the complexity 
of languages to converge to a minimal amount. A similar claim is that general-purpose 
learning devices, except in rote learning mode, produce only “good shapes” (Gestalten), 
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i.e. structures that are left invariant by operations forming an algebraic group (Dessalles, 
1998a). Language has not, so far, been described as involving good shapes. For instance, 
syntactic structures, contrary to many other aspects of cognition, cannot be induced as 
invariants of transformation groups (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1979) and seem to thwart general 
inductive processes (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989). 
In a bio-functional account of language emergence, learnability puts limits on 
what is admissible, but is subordinate to communicative functions. The two main 
proximal functions of language in our species, as revealed by the observation of 
spontaneous language behavior, are conversational narratives and argumentative 
discussion (Bruner, 1986; Dessalles, 2007). From a bio-functional perspective, iconicity 
is dispensable if the problem is to express predicates for argumentative purposes 
(Dessalles, 2007). Lexical proliferation is predicted if the problem is to signal 
unexpectedness in narratives and to express nuances in argumentative discussion 
(Dessalles, 2007). And language-specific learning bias is expected if early language 
performance makes a biological difference. Let us consider a fourth example to show that 
functional aspects of language could evolve at the expense of learnability. 
Non-functional accounts of language, including cultural selection through iterated 
learning, do not account for the existence of central embedding (the fact that any branch 
may grow in a syntactic tree), a feature present in virtually all languages. Recursive 
syntax has been shown to emerge through iterated learning, but only when individuals 
already have the built-in ability to use recursive grammars to parse linguistic input (e.g. 
Kirby, 2002). A bio-functional approach to language provides an explanation for the 
presence of central embedding in language. As soon as the cognitive ability to form 
predicates is available, possibly for argumentative purposes (Dessalles, 2007), predicates 
can be recruited to determine the arguments of other predicates. This technique is 
implemented in computer languages such as Prolog. To express “Mary hit Paul” for 
listeners who do not know Mary, the speaker may use “Mary ate with us yesterday” to 
determine the first argument of “hit”. Prolog achieves this through explicit variable 
sharing, whereas human languages connect phrases for the same purpose: “The girl who 
ate with us yesterday hit Paul” (Dessalles, 2007).  
Predicates P1i can therefore be used to determine arguments in a given predicate 
P1; but each P1i may require further predicates P1ij to determine its own arguments. This 
possibility leads to recursive syntactic processing that produces central embedded phrase 
structures. Models that ignore functions like predicate argument determination cannot 
account for the necessity of embedded phrase processing. They merely postulate it, either 
as a consequence of some fortuitous genetic accident (Chomsky 1975) or deduce it from 
a general cognitive ability to perform recursive parsing (Kirby, 2002). But then, the 
adequacy to the function is left unexplained as well. No single genetic accident and no 
selection through repeated learning can predict that phrase embedding will efficiently 
fulfill predicate argument determination. Only a bio-functional approach that derives the 
existence of phrase embedding from its function can hope to explain why recursive 
processing came to exist and why it is locally optimal for that function. 
From a phylogenetic perspective we may wonder why, if human languages have 
been selected to be easily learned, chimpanzees are so far from acquiring them, 
spontaneously or not. One must hypothesize some yet unknown qualitative gap between 
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animal and human general learning abilities. Invoking such “pre-adaptation” remains, for 
now, non-parsimonious. Not only is the emergence of “pre-adaptations” not accounted 
for in iterated learning models and more broadly in non-functional models, but their 
subsequent assemblage into a functional whole remains mysterious as well. Bio-
functional approaches to language emergence avoid the “pre-adaptation” trap. They do 
not attempt to explain why a given feature did not occur in other lineages by invoking the 
lack of required “pre-adaptations”.  
Language is not a marginal habit that would be incidentally used in our species. It 
has dramatic influence, not merely on survival but on differential reproduction, which is 
what determines natural selection. Individuals who fail to be relevant are excluded from 
social networks and become preferential victims (Dessalles 1998b; 2007). Given the 
crucial impact of conversational performance on reproductive success, it would be highly 
unlikely that human brains could have evolved independently from language. 
 
References 
 
Briscoe, T. (2006). Language learning, power laws, and sexual selection. In A. Cangelosi, 
A. D. M. Smith & K. Smith (Eds.), The evolution of language. Singapore: World 
Scientific. 
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Chater, N. (1999). The search for simplicity: A fundamental cognitive principle?. The 
Quaterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 52 (A), 273-302. 
Chomsky, N. (1975). Reflections on language. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Cornuéjols, A. (1996). Analogie, principe d'économie et complexité algorithmique. In 
Actes des 11èmes Journées Françaises de l'Apprentissage. Sète. Available at: 
www.lri.fr/~antoine/Papers/JFA96-final-osX.pdf  
Dessalles, J-L. (1998a). Limits of isotropic bias in natural and artificial models of 
learning. In G. Ritschard, A. Berchtold, F. Duc & D. A. Zighed (Eds.), Apprentissage : 
Des principes naturels aux méthodes artificielles, 307-319. Paris: Hermès. Available at: 
www.dessalles.fr/papiers/pap.cogni/Dessalles_97062502.pdf   
Dessalles, J-L. (1998b). Altruism, status, and the origin of relevance. In J. R. Hurford, M. 
Studdert-Kennedy & C. Knight (Eds.), Approaches to the evolution of language: social 
and cognitive bases, 130-147. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: 
www.dessalles.fr/papiers/pap.evol/Dessalles_96122602.pdf    
Dessalles, J-L. (2007). Why we talk - The evolutionary origins of language. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. www.dessalles.fr/WWT/  
 4 
Kirby, S. (2002). Learning, bottlenecks and the evolution of recursive syntax. In T. 
Briscoe (Ed.), Linguistic evolution through language acquisition: Formal and 
computational models, 173-203. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1979). Théories du langage - Théories de l'apprentissage. Paris: 
Seuil. 
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1989). Evolution, selection and cognition: From 'learning' to 
parameter setting in biology and in the study of language. Cognition, 31 (1), 1-44. 
Solomonoff, R. J. (1978). Complexity-based induction systems: Comparisons and 
convergence theorems. IEEE transactions on Information Theory, 24 (4), 422-432. 
Available at: 
world.std.com/~rjs/solo1.pdf  
 
